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Abstract
In the current debate, we witness a conflict between the Christian concept of man 
vs. concepts that justify in vitro fertilization (IVF), genetic enhancement, or the 
reassignment of sexuality. Modern concepts cannot disregard the historic perspec-
tive of the consistent doctrines that the Catholic Church has maintained through-
out her 2000-year history and which constitute the precursors of contemporary 
bioethics. Although she has adjusted specifics occasionally to address new deve- 
lopments, she has always based doctrine on immutable core principles. The current 
conflict lies neither in the novelty of the new proposals, nor in a conflict between 
religious and lay worldviews, but rather in concepts of man and human perfection. 
Some human traits may be regarded as disordered and incompatible with a par-
ticular concept of human perfection. The new proposals tend to involve physical 
changes based on technological manipulation, with a goal of developing a superior 
being, while Christian proposals do not seek to manipulate man’s being, but to de-
velop his existing potential within criteria of acceptable reason. The new proposals 
rely on a Cartesian view which constitutes a human as his mind (cogito ergo sum), 
which has dominion over his body including authority to reengineer it according 
to any project that mind conceives. In contrast, the Christian concept views the 
human subject as a unity of mind and body, which may not be reshaped to meet 
a questionable goal of human perfection. The technological tools within the new 
concepts are in no way superior to the more personal attributes like virtues, perfec-
tion of the human will, prayer, and ascesis within the Christian concept. 
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Introduction
In the current era, we are witnessing rapid and astonishing develop-
ments in science and technology. Among others things, these devel-
opments concern medical sciences and biotechnology, which are the 
human activities that constitute the subject of bioethics. They have be-
come possible in the wake of the scientific advances, which have taken 
place since archaic scholastic and medieval thinking about the material 
world were abandoned. This new approach relies notably on modern 
philosophy and particularly on Descartes and Francis Bacon. However, 
there is still a large population that contends that medieval philosophy 
and anthropology may tell us something important about mankind. 
These are not only Christian believers who follow certain patterns of 
thinking about mankind in obedience to faith, but they are also philos-
ophers and theologians ready to defend those statements through the 
application of contemporary psychological observations. Discussion 
with the proponents of new anthropology can be difficult because they 
tend to acknowledge as scientifically valid only that reasoning which 
is based on or refers to the methodology proper to empirical science. 
Thus, any other argumentation or reasoning is dismissed “with the back 
of the hand” as too abstract, too theoretical, or too loosely linked to the 
easily verifiable experience. However, when we consider some of the 
statements of the empirical sciences, we notice that they cannot exist 
without certain philosophical assumptions (although not always ex-
pressed in an explicit way) which are theoretical and “abstract” and not 
necessarily obvious or easily verifiable. This observation helps us to un-
derstand that any methodological gap between empirical science and 
medieval philosophical statements, which also refer to some empirical 
observations, is not as significant as they might contend. Neverthe-
less, each philosophical statement (whether it belongs to Christian, or 
medieval, or new, or any anthropology) must refer to common human 
experience, which remains the ultimate criterion of its validity.1 Thus, 
reference to the common human experience remains the main criterion 
of the epistemological value of any anthropological statement. This ob-
servation should in particular be considered by the people who advo-
cate projects of perfecting certain human traits. It should also concern 
1 C. Huber, Limiti della validità del sapere scientifico, in: A. C. Spagnolo, E. Sgrec-
cia (eds.) Lineamenti di etica della sperimentazione clinica, Milano 1994, p. 29–38.
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members of the medical and legal professions who feel challenged by 
such proposals.
The Philosophical Basis for Modern Science
“Francis Bacon introduced a  new idea to science. Until then pure 
knowledge (theoria) had been the principal goal and ultimate end of 
scientific activity. […] After the work of Bacon the value of science has 
been expressed in terms of its practical utility: science should contrib-
ute to increasing the comfort of life. This was the beginning of a new 
era, namely the era of technology. ‘Technological advances represent 
the only actual possessions held in common by man; they condition all 
other changes that take place on the world and verify the mastery of 
man over nature – his supreme earthly goal.’  ”2 The novelty introduced 
by Bacon consisted in “the passage from discovery to invention (which, 
however, presupposed knowledge of the primary data). It stressed 
methodology as crucial in promoting new findings which science then 
invented, constructing them and then submitting them to verification. 
To resolve problems ultimately meant to find new (i.e. technological) 
solutions for them. The ‘methodological’ changes were accompanied by 
a new understanding of nature. It is no longer a given ‘whole’ which is 
to be investigated without penetration of its very depth: ‘rather, nature 
now represents something alterable and irreducible, which can receive 
different formations, which underlies them as their base and remains 
itself unchanged throughout.’ The notion of intellect, which aimed at 
the understanding of essence was replaced by discursive reason, which 
aimed at seeking out what is the same in all. The uniformity and equal-
ity of human reasoning were assumed to be the fundamental conditions 
for the transmission of information and accumulation of knowledge 
and ultimately the effective cause of scientific progress.”3 
2 T. Kraj, Scientific Progress as a Moral Problem. Implications in Modern Genetics, 
doctorate prepared in the Pontifical John Paul II Institute for Study on Marriage and 
Family at the Lateran University, Rome 1999. Unpublished. Manuscript, p. 29. Author 
quotes: P. Henrici, From Progress to Development: A History of Ideas, in: Theology Meets 
Progress, P. Land, Rome 1971, p. 48.
3 T. Kraj, Scientific Progress as a  Moral Problem, p.  29–30. The text quoted: 
P. Henrici, From Progress to Development..., p. 48.
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This premise also permits us to witness the remarkable results of 
the development of contemporary science. These achievements re-
sulted in human self confidence in what concerns man’s influence in 
the world that surrounds him. The result of this confidence is the new 
areas man enters into in order to better recognize them and submit 
them to himself. Thus, we already have numerous fields where the ef-
forts of scientists help to free people from the tyranny of nature and 
its disadvantageous conditions. If something does not work as we 
wish it to, we try to change it with more and more efficient techno-
logical tools. 
The Christian Attitude  
Towards Modern Science 
Christians also note the changes in the world brought about through 
scientific progress. What is more, Christians have participated in that 
progress themselves. Also the Roman Catholic Church accepts it and 
its achievements. “‘Homo technicus’, as a leading standard – bearer for 
progress theory, does not represent either a non-Christian or a posi-
tively anti-Christian figure.”4 The possible opposition does not result 
from an inner logic of the idea of progress. It is usually a result of per-
sonal convictions of the proponents of progress (very often postulating 
unlimited manipulations with man) who perceive the Church as the 
institution that impedes progress through its insistence on maintaining 
the existing social order. 
If the Church does not oppose the new projects of science, does it 
mean that there are no limits to the application of science? What if 
it tends to improve the human being? These questions were noticed 
a long time ago. For instance they were present in Pope Paul VI’s fa-
mous Encyclical Letter Humanae vitae. Proclaimed in 1968, it tells us: 
“But the most remarkable development of all is to be seen in man’s 
stupendous progress in the domination and rational organization of 
the forces of nature to the point that he is endeavoring to extend this 
control over every aspect of his own life – over his body, over his mind 
and emotions, over his social life” (HV 2). If we find that it would be 
a useful solution to link the sides of a  river, we build a bridge; if we 
4 T. Kraj, Scientific Progress as a Moral Problem, p. 70.
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desire a better crop of wheat or cotton, we use some fertilizers which 
could increase that crop; if we want to have biological “factories” of rare 
proteins we use some techniques of genetic engineering to create trans-
genic animals. Hence, if we have a  technical solution that improves 
the human being are we allowed in the same vein to proceed with the 
scientific manipulation of our own species? Do any limits need to come 
into play when we consider mankind instead of the external world? 
Which application of scientific and technological tools may be permit-
ted in man, and which should be restricted? The answer to this question 
requires some clarifications.
The Clarification of Key Notions
In order to answer the main question, which is: “Christian anthropol-
ogy versus the new anthropology and the quest for human perfection,” 
we need to define Christian anthropology, new anthropology, and hu-
man perfection, and we further need to come to terms with the issue 
of: who is man. 
Christian anthropology here is the anthropology supported by 
the Roman Catholic Church (but not only the Church). This is not 
a theological anthropology but a philosophical one, i.e. one which is 
based on human reason and not necessarily on some typically religious 
or theological assumptions. The new anthropology is the one that is 
rooted in the outlook initiated by the philosophy of Descartes, par-
ticularly with his famous assertion cogito ergo sum and the “division” 
of man into res cogitans and res extensa, which have some important 
anthropological consequences. Finally, our concept of human perfec-
tion does not refer to the situation of a disease or other kind of human 
disability where employment of technological tools is justified for the 
good of human health or even of human life. We refer to the situation 
of the normally healthy man who in his quest for the improvement 
of his human condition intends to use certain technical tools. The ap-
plication of genetic enhancement projects provides a good example of 
such a situation.
The last two questions mentioned above concern man: who is man 
and what constitutes his perfection? Among various definitions of man, 
the ancient one which defines man as animal rationale i.e. the rational 
animal, seems to be the most adequate for the purpose of this paper, i.e. 
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to explain the difference between the two anthropologies mentioned 
above. Thus, there are two important elements in man: rational and 
corporeal. Our attitude toward man depends on how we define their 
mutual relationship. Which one is more important if any? Which de-
cides that man is man? And finally what does rational mean? Since the 
answer to the latter influences the definition of human perfection it 
will be given below. 
Modern Philosophy  
and Its Anthropological Consequences
Modern anthropology refers to the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum,” 
which suggests that the rational part of man is the one which decides 
that a being is a man. Even if we agree that Descartes did not set-
tle the question in a radical way, his position does not exclude such 
a  consequence. What constitutes me would be my reason and the 
body is subordinate to what reason determines. The human body 
would be of a  lesser value than the spiritual and rational “part” of 
man, and it would be subjected to the dispositions dictated by reason. 
From this conclusion there are only a few steps to the claim that the 
corporeal aspect of the being is of no significant value and we can 
change its parameters practically at will. There are three well known 
contemporary ideologies which refer to this kind of thinking: eugen-
ics, with its ideas of enhancing various human traits; transhuman-
ism, with its projects to overcome human bodily limitations with the 
new construct of the posthuman being; and gender ideology, which 
rejects the value of the human body in questions of human sexual 
self-determination. 
The Christian and Modern Approach  
to Man and His Perfection
The common human experience says that the human body is an im-
portant part of who we are; it is a constitutive part of the human being, 
and it should not be treated as something unimportant. That is why we 
do not accept bodily damage: law forbids deliberately causing it and 
medicine undertakes various efforts to cure a damaged body. We also 
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are indignant if a dead human body is not treated with appropriate 
dignity. We recognize the value of the human body, its inclinations, 
and qualities, and we do so even in spite of its imperfections. Such rec-
ognition reminds us of the need for rational management of our body. 
However, rational does not only mean being governed by reason. There 
are recognized situations where somebody puts into practice ideas like 
self-mutilation, which, although they are governed by reason, hardly 
could be called rational. That is why rational governing also means 
governing according to the requirements of right reason, i.e. directed 
towards the good.
According to Christian anthropology, man is a rational animal. This 
purports that the body be governed by reason, which in turn should 
proceed towards good. This is the path to achieving human perfec-
tion. However, rational self-governing is very difficult because the hu-
man body has a resistance which should be overcome. Various human 
bodily inclinations, if not governed by right reason, contribute rather 
to human weaknesses than to perfection. These human shortcomings 
are well known not only to Christians. All people cope with them and 
all of them see the need to change them. Among the various mea-
sures for accomplishing this, there are two, which are the subject of 
this presentation. The first is virtue, which is compatible with Christian 
anthropology, and the second is the technological approach, which is 
based on modern anthropology. On the surface, they may seem to be 
very similar. Both include the idea of the rational governing of human 
bodily inclinations and both seem to pursue similar results. What, then, 
is the difference between them?
There are some outcomes that may be obtained exclusively with our 
personal effort. If we want to achieve human rational self-governance 
and to integrate some important human inclination into the whole-
ness of the human person, we need to integrate it with the human 
spiritual effort which refers to the perfecting of the human will, ascesis, 
and prayer. A good example is human sexuality. Although its personal 
integration is a difficult task, it is still possible through the perfecting 
of the human will by repeated good choices, behavioral norms that 
the individual chooses for himself, ascesis, and prayer. The personal in-
tegration of human sexuality is a necessary step towards responsible 
parenthood. It is obvious, the couple could also procreate and plan their 
family without any such effort, using technical tools or other devices 
or behaviors which make the spiritual effort unnecessary, however the 
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result will not be the same. There will not be personal integration of 
their sexuality, which manifests itself in the virtue of matrimonial chas-
tity and rational self-governing which results in the good for their mat-
rimony, family, and children.5 
In another example: the vast and always more extensive application 
of drugs formerly used to treat children with ADHD, also seems to 
resolve the problem of naughty children. Instead of taking the trouble 
to educate their children, parents are tempted to use drugs. The resul-
tant child is quiet and polite, but this optimistic picture changes when 
the drug effectiveness wears off. If one followed this proposal the child 
would grow without any personal effort to diminish his or her short-
comings. The resultant adult would be someone who would lack certain 
specific human abilities with which they would be able to resolve the 
problems they would meet in life.6 
Sometimes it seems that the expected result may be obtained ef-
fortlessly, quickly, and painlessly. It is necessary only to find a proper 
technical tool to free us from the effort. There are some fields in hu-
man life where such a solution does not work. These are those areas 
where conscious rational human effort and spiritual willpower are 
necessary to resolve the problem effectively and in a human way. Ra-
tional – I would like to repeat – means not only directed by reason, 
but also based on the choice of truly humanistic values. This does not 
take place where personal human effort and virtue resulting from 
it are replaced with technical or other solutions. Although at first 
glance the results seem to be the same or at least similar, they are ac-
tually completely different.7 Rational, virtuous human self-governing 
which results from spiritual effort is not found where the p e r s o n a l 
is diminished and replaced with the t e c h n i c a l , i.e. material. If we 
desire to progress in human perfection we cannot resign from what 
is human and personal (although sometimes it is difficult) and de-
cide to replace what is purely human with what is technical. History 
has seen proposals of replacement of virtue with such substitutes as 
natural goodness (Rousseau, Emerson), social engineering (Fourier, 
5 T. Kraj, Granice genetycznego ulepszania człowieka [The Acceptable Limits of Ge-
netic Enhancement in Humans], Kraków 2010, p. 112–117.
6 The President’s Council on Bioethics, A Report: Beyond Therapy. Biotechnology 
and the Pursuit of Happiness, Washington D.C. 2003, p. 71–74, 118–119.
7 T. Kraj, Granice..., p. 264–279. 
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Marx), and psycho-technology (Freud).8 None of these proposals 
succeeded in bringing perfection to man. The same seems to happen 
if we follow the contemporary biotechnological proposals, namely 
that with the change of some biological parameters we are able to 
gain human perfection. Step by step it becomes our common convic-
tion that what requires personal effort (sometimes ascesis) may not 
be replaced with an impersonal technical manipulation. The human 
life has its taste and value and it comes with a price, but it is the 
price of making an integral part of the very human existence, and it 
is worth the cost.
Conclusion
The most important difference between Christian anthropology and 
the new anthropology (i.e. rooted in the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum”) 
consists in the attitude towards the human body: whether it is an in-
tegral, constitutive part of the human person, or merely raw mate-
rial to be formed and valued according to changing concepts born of 
the human mind. Christian anthropology says that some areas within 
man require personal human effort to master them according to the 
requirements of right human reason, while the new anthropology says 
that in such cases we may legitimately take a  short cut, i.e. use the 
technical tools or devices, and resolve the problem without human ef-
fort. If the latter approach were still inefficient, it remains possible to 
change our bodily parameters. Both solutions, i.e. the one compatible 
with Christian anthropology and the other based on the modern an-
thropology, seem to bring about the same results. In fact they do not. 
Also the kinds of human perfection that results from both of them are 
completely different.9 
8 Y. Simon, The Definition of Moral Virtue, New York 1986, p. 4–5, 10, 14–15.
9 Conference proclaimed November 19, 2013 during The United Nations Educa-
tional Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Chair in Bioethics 9th World 
Conference Bioethics, Medical Ethics & Health Law,Towards the 21st Century, in the 
University of Naples Federico II, Italy, November 19–20–21, 2013. Abstract in www.isas.
co.il/bioethics2013/ethic-book-website.pdf, p. 102.
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